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CURRENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PERsONAL RIGHTs-LEvER ACT 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL-
The defendant was indicted for violating section 4 of the Lever Act, Comp. 
St.
U. S. i918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. i919, sec. 31I5 i/8 ff. The Act makes 
it
"unlawful for any person wilfully to make any unjust or unreasonable rate or
charge in handling or dealing in or with any necessaries; to conspire, combine,
agree, or arrange with any other person... (e) to exact excessive prices for any
necessaries. . . . " The court quashed the indictment on the ground 
that the
statute was a violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution in that 
it
denied to the accused adequate information as to the nature and cause of his
accusation. Held, that this judgment should be affirmed. United States v.
Cohen Grocery Co. (Feb. 28, i92i) U. S. Sup. Ct., Oct. Term, Ig2o, No. 324.
The majority of the court based their opinion upon the ground that the statute
was unconstitutional for the reasons given by the lower court. Two justices
concurred in the result, but only on the ground that the statute should not be
interpreted to cover the exacting of excessive prices upon the sale of merchan-
dise. See COMMENTS (1920) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 81.
CONTRACTS-IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERIOR4ANc,--GovERNMENT WAR RESTRICTIONS
AS AN ExcusE-The plaintiff agreed to ship to the defendant one million ice
cream cones in monthly. shipments, payment to be made for each installment one
month after delivery. Because of government war-time food regulations the
plaintiff was unable to send the specified number per month, but sent as many
as were allowed by the government restrictions. The defendant refused to pay
the agreed amount, claiming damages due to the fact that he had to purchase
cones elsewhere at a higher price. Held, that the plaintiff may recover for the
cones shipped at the contract price. Jersey Ice Cream Co. v. Banner Cone Co.
(I920, Ala.) 86 So. 382.
A contractor is not excused from performing merely because of the increased
difficulty or expense, but is excused if the impossibility is caused by a change in
the domestic law. See CoMMENTs (1919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 399. It would
indeed be a gross injustice if society should make a promisor liable for failing
to perform a contract, which it has, after the contract was entered into, made
it illegal for him to perform. 3 Williston, Contracts (192o) sec. 1938.
INSURANCE-ACCIDENT INSURANCE--CoNSTRUCTION OF PoLicY.-The plaintiff's
intestate was insured by the defendant company against accidents. On the out-
side fold of the policy was written the statement that "This policy, subject to its
conditions... covers all bodily injuries caused by accidental means, such as...
injuries inflicted by robbers or highwaymen." There was a condition inside the
policy in small print which limited the liability of the defendant to twenty per
cent of the face of the policy in the case of "injuries intentionally inflicted upon
the insured by himself -or by any other person." The intestate was killed by a
robber. The administrator brought an action to. collect the full amount of the
policy. Held, that he should recoveri the court construing the policy "strictly
against the insurer" and adopting the construction "which is most favorable to
the insured." Hessler v. Federal Casualty Co. (I92i, Ind.) 129 N. E. 325.
The decision reflects the modern tendency of the courts to impose a duty on
the insurance company to pay according to the probable expectations of the
insured irrespective of the special conditions of the contract in fine print. S~e
COMMENTS (92) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 287. For discussions of what injuries
are accidental, see (1918) 28 id. 193; (1914) 24 id. 83.
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PRAcTicF-BiAs OF JUDGE-POWER OF JUDGE TO PASS ON HIS OWN DISQUALFCA-
TIoN.-The defendants were indicted on a'charge of violating the Espionage Act
They filed an affidavit under section 2r of the federal Judicial Code charging the
presiding judge with bias; and prejudice and alleging specifically his remarks at
previous trials of defendants of German extraction. The judge denied the
motion, based on the affidavit, for the assignment of another judge and pro-
ceeded with the trial, which resulted in conviction. Held, that the presiding
judge had power to pass on the legal sufficiency of the affidavit, but not on the
truth of the facts constituting his disqualification. Day, Pitney, and McRey-
nolds, JJ., dissenting. Berger v. United States (1921) 41 Sup. Ct. 230.
The decision of the Supreme Court upholds the previous interpretation of
section 21 by the federal courts. Henry v. Speer (913, C. C. A. 5th) 201 Fed.
869. The tendency of the state courts is also to limit the power of the judge topass on the legal sufficiency of the affidavit. Woodmnull v. State (1914) 181 Ind.
613, io5 N. E. 155 ; State 'v. District Court (914) 49 Mont. 247, 141 Pac. 659.
A few states require him to decide on his own disqualification. In re Friedman's
Estate (1915) 1i Calif. 431, 153 Pac. 918; Kelly v. Ferguson (i911) 5 Okl. Cr.
App. 316, 114 Pac. 631. The rule in the particular jurisdiction, of course, depends
on the language of the statute. For a general discussion of the basis of disquali-
fication of judges see (921) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 305.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-DUTY OF RAILROAD TO KEEP A LOOKOUT FOR ANIMALS-
The plaintiff's sheep were being driven across the railroad track when a passen-
ger train ran into them and killed twenty-eight. The herder in charge had mis-
calculated the time of the train. The sheep had been grazing on the public
domain and were being driven across the tracks for water. Being out in the
open country, there was no regular crossing. Held, that the herder was guilty
of contributory negligence and that, although he was a mere licensee, there was
no duty on the company to keep a lookout. Cummings v. Hines (i92i, Utah)
194 Pac. goi.
If the sheep had been seen on the tracks before and the herder was a licensee,
even those cases which hold that a railroad is under no duty to keep a lookout
for trespassers would not support the conclusion of the court in the instant
case. See (i92o) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 697. For a collection of cases see 24
L. R. A. (N. s.) 858, note. Under the last clear chance doctrine it seems that
the plaintiff should have recovered, since the engineer had about a half mile of
straight track in which to see the sheep. See COMMENTS (IWO) 29 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 542, 896, 555; 5s L. R. A. 418, note.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE IN PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT-INJURY To THIRD PARTY.-
The defendants had been engaged by a vendor of beans to weigh a quantity
which they knew the plaintiff had bought and had contracted to pay for according
to the defendants' certificate of weight This the defendants negligently certified
to be more than it actually was, and the plaintiff, in consequence, overpaid.the
vendor. He then brought an action of tort for this negligence. Held, that
the defendants were liable. Glanzer v. Shepard (192o, App. Div.) I86 N. Y.
Supp. 88.
See COMMENTS, supra, p. 6o7.
